OUR FIVE POLICY SOLUTIONS

Overview

Back from the Brink calls on the United States to lead a global effort to prevent nuclear war. In order to do so, we urge the U.S. to enact these five policy solutions:

• Pursue global elimination of nuclear weapons through a verifiable agreement among nuclear-armed states to eliminate their nuclear arsenals
• Renounce the option of using nuclear weapons first
• End the sole, unchecked authority of any president to launch a nuclear attack
• Take U.S. nuclear weapons off hair-trigger alert
• Cancel the plan to replace the entire U.S. arsenal with enhanced weapons

These policy solutions are outlined in our congressional resolutions — H. Res. 317 in the U.S. House and S. Res. 323 in the U.S. Senate. Learn more about supporting our resolutions.

You can navigate to each of our five policy solutions by clicking the down arrow next to the section name at the top of the page.

Pursue Global Elimination

Given the extraordinary destructive power of nuclear weapons, it should be the highest U.S. national security priority to pursue a verifiable agreement among nuclear-armed states to eliminate their nuclear arsenals.

Even our own nuclear weapons pose an existential threat to our survival. Recent studies have shown that the use of any significant portion of our nuclear arsenal against cities, even against an adversary who never fired back, could cause worldwide climate disruption and global famine. The United States needs to initiate negotiations with all of the nuclear weapons states on a verifiable agreement to eliminate these weapons.

The U.S. — like Britain, China, France and Russia — is already obligated under Article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to take concrete steps toward eliminating its nuclear arsenal. Nations that joined the NPT as non-nuclear-weapons states, pledging that they would not develop their own nuclear weapons, did so in part on the basis of this promise of disarmament. These states have become increasingly frustrated at the lack of progress among the nuclear weapons states toward meeting their treaty obligations.

One response to this frustration was the negotiation of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), which was approved in July 2017 by 122 countries, and has so far been signed and ratified by 94 and 73 countries respectively (as of September 2025). 

The treaty is modeled on existing treaties outlawing other types of weapons considered inhumane, such as biological and chemical weapons, land mines, and cluster munitions, and makes it illegal under international law to “develop, test, produce, manufacture, otherwise acquire, possess, or stockpile nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.” The TPNW reached the required 50 national ratifications on October 24, 2020 and entered into force in January 2021.

The United States refused to participate in the negotiating process and has continued to actively encourage countries to reject the TPNW. This attitude has not served it well and must change. The U.S. and the other eight nuclear-armed nations should live up to their responsibility to begin negotiations now for a verifiable, enforceable, time bound agreement to dismantle nuclear weapons. Such an agreement can be implemented through the TPNW under its Article 4 provisions.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

Path to a Nuclear Weapons-Free World. This section of our Beginner’s Guide to Nuclear Weapons outlines how nuclear abolition is not only possible, it has precedent.

A Close Look at Nuclear War. This section of our Beginner’s Guide provides additional context on what would actually happen if a nuclear bomb went off, and details the risks and consequences of nuclear war.

Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. The International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) web resource provides detailed and updated information about the treaty text, status of signatories and ratifications, Meetings of States Parties, and treaty working groups.

TPNW States Confront Escalating Nuclear Dangers. April 2025 analysis from the Arms Control Association on the Third meeting of States Parties (3MSP) to the TPNW held in March 2025.

Renounce First Use

The United States has never renounced the right to use nuclear weapons first. This increases the chance that a conflict could escalate to nuclear war. The United States should instead declare that it will never be the first to use nuclear weapons.

The Obama administration narrowed the role of nuclear weapons by stating that the U.S. would not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against any country without nuclear weapons that was in compliance with its nuclear nonproliferation obligations.

However, it stopped short of declaring that the sole purpose of U.S. nuclear weapons was to deter the use of nuclear weapons. Instead, it cited “a narrow range of contingencies” in which U.S. nuclear weapons might be used: to deter an attack on the U.S. or its allies using conventional, chemical, or biological weapons by a state that possessed nuclear weapons or was not in compliance with its nonproliferation obligations.

The first Trump administration’s Nuclear Posture Review broadened the range of scenarios that might lead to the first use of U.S. nuclear weapons. These, it says, “include, but are not limited to, attacks on the U.S., allied, or partner civilian population or infrastructure, and attacks on U.S. or allied nuclear forces, their command and control, or warning and attack assessment capabilities.”

Substantially broadening the range of circumstances under which the United States would consider the first use of nuclear weapons is a step in the wrong direction. It makes a nuclear war more likely by reducing the threshold for nuclear use. Retaining the option to use nuclear weapons as part of a preemptive or preventive strike, or in response to conventional, chemical, biological, or other types of weapons creates a dangerous uncertainty. It makes it more likely that an adversary facing the threat of U.S. nuclear weapons use may decide that it needs to be the first to take this step. 

Given the overwhelming strength of its conventional military, the U.S. has nothing to gain from escalating a conflict to the nuclear level. Indeed, the United States and the world have everything to lose.

The U.S. should declare that it will never be the first to use nuclear weapons, and would use them only in response to a previous nuclear attack. Of course, our goal is the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, but as long as they exist, a “no first use” declaration would reduce the likelihood that tensions or conventional conflict with another nuclear-armed state would escalate to nuclear use.

Members of Congress have introduced relevant legislation regarding this matter. In the 119th Congress, H. Res. 669 and S. Res. 192 – Restricting First Use of Nuclear Weapons Act of 2025 introduced by Rep. Ted Lieu (D-CA) and Sen. Edward Markey (D-MA), respectively, reaffirms that only Congress—not the president—has the constitutional authority to declare war. The bill would prohibit any U.S. president from initiating a first-use nuclear strike without explicit Congressional approval.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

Voters Strongly Support a “No First Use” Nuclear Policy. Polling in New Hampshire, Iowa, Michigan, Ohio, South Carolina, and Georgia commissioned by the Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS) found that there is strong support for a No First Use policy. 

U.S. Military Options Should Not Include Starting a Nuclear War. This UCS fact sheet explains the security benefits of a No First Use policy and how it would make the United States safer.

No First Use (Frequently Asked Questions). This fact sheet from the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation answers common questions about a No First Use policy. 

End Hair-Trigger Alert

The United States has roughly 1,700 deployed nuclear weapons and another several thousand in reserve. 400 of these are on missiles in underground silos, ready to be launched within minutes of a presidential order. This alert status, called hair-trigger alert, increases the chance of a launch in response to a false alarm. There have been numerous close calls over the past 40 years due to both human and technological errors, and keeping missiles on high alert increases the danger of accidental war. There is no compelling rationale for maintaining this option. The United States should remove its missiles from hair-trigger alert.

This risky alert status, coupled with the option of ordering a launch based on warning of an incoming attack, increases the chance that a nuclear war could start due to a false alarm or other error. Maintaining hair-trigger alert options leads to unnecessarily rushed decision making.

A land-based missile can travel between Russia and the United States in about 30 minutes, and a submarine-launched missile could take as little as 10 to 15 minutes to reach its target. After receiving warning of an attack, military and political leaders would have only minutes to assess the credibility of this information and decide how to respond. This time pressure increases the danger of ordering a launch based on faulty information, and over the past forty years there have been numerous examples of close calls due to computer or human error.

Hair-trigger alert is an outdated policy — the original rationale was the fear during the Cold War that either side could launch a surprise first strike that might wipe out its adversary’s ability to retaliate, which at that time largely consisted of land-based missiles and bombers. 

Today such an attack is exceedingly unlikely, but even if the worst were to happen, the United States now deploys more than 1,000 nuclear warheads on submarine-based missiles, hidden at sea. These sea-based missiles are not under the same pressure to be launched quickly as land-based missiles, and ensure that the United States would still be able to launch a retaliatory strike.

There is no compelling reason to maintain U.S. missiles on hair-trigger alert, and many reasons not to. Taking land-based missiles off hair-trigger alert and removing rapid-launch options from U.S. nuclear plans would reduce the risk of nuclear use.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

Reducing the Risk of Nuclear War: Taking Nuclear Weapons Off High-Alert. This report by the Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS) explains the Cold War origins of hair-trigger-alert policies, the dangers of these policies, close calls throughout history, and the benefits of taking land-based nuclear missiles off hair-trigger alert and removing rapid-launch options from nuclear war plans.

Frequently Asked Questions about Hair-Trigger Alert. This UCS fact sheet answers questions such as, What does it mean to say that nuclear missiles are on hair-trigger alert? Why would taking missiles off hair-trigger alert increase our security? How could the U.S. take missiles off hair-trigger alert?

End Sole Authority

Currently there is no check on the president’s authority to order the use of nuclear weapons, either first or in response to a nuclear attack. If the president decided to launch a nuclear strike, they would simply notify the military of this decision. The president may consult advisers, but this is not required, and no one has the authority to countermand a legal launch order. This system is risky and unjustified. There are practical ways to include multiple decision-makers in authorizing the use of nuclear weapons, and the United States should adopt such changes.

Presidential sole authority is an artifact of the Cold War, when the greatest fear was a massive bolt-from-the-blue first strike by the Soviet Union that would wipe out the United States’ missiles before it had a chance to retaliate. But this system is risky and now unjustified; no single individual should be able to make such a momentous decision. There are practical ways that the process can be changed to include multiple decision-makers in authorizing the use of nuclear weapons, and the U.S. should adopt such changes.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

How would the U.S. launch a nuclear weapon? This section of our Beginner’s Guide to Nuclear Weapons provides a primer on sole authority and the process of launching a nuclear weapon in the U.S.

Three Heads Are Better Than One: How to Limit the President’s Single-handed Authority to Order the Use of Nuclear Weapons. This fact sheet from the Union of Concerned Scientists provides an alternative plan to end the sole authority of the president by utilizing the Federal Emergency Management Agency tracking and communication system to require consent from more people than just the president.

Defense Primer: Command and Control of Nuclear Forces Congressional Research Service. This fact sheet from the Federation of American Scientists gives an overview of the Nuclear Command and Control System and Options for Nuclear Use.

Most Americans Are Uncomfortable with the Policy of Sole Nuclear Authority. 2023 polling from the Chicago Council on Global Affairs and Carnegie Corporation of New York finds most Americans are wary of the president having the sole authority to authorize the use of nuclear weapons.

Cancel Enhanced Weapons

Over the next 30 years, the United States plans to spend an estimated $1.7 trillion dollars to replace its entire nuclear arsenal and the bombers, missiles, and submarines that deliver the weapons with more capable versions. Such a tremendous investment of money and effort is unnecessary. The U.S.’s current nuclear arsenal is more than sufficient to deter an attack (and indeed sufficient to destroy life on this planet as we know it many times over), and the conventional military deterrent is also sufficient to not need additional nuclear weapons or upgrades. Thus, the U.S. should cancel the plan to replace its entire U.S. arsenal with enhanced weapons.

In addition, according to many experts, nuclear modernization tremendously increases the risks of catastrophic cyber-attacks on the U.S. nuclear weapons arsenal. As new technology is integrated into our nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3) infrastructure, we inevitably shift control over our arsenal closer to the Internet and other types of systems that can be hacked from afar by malicious state and non-state actors.

Rebuilding the U.S. arsenal also sends a counterproductive message to the rest of the world by making it clear that the U.S. continues to see its nuclear arsenal as central to its security and intends to keep it for the foreseeable future. This will only encourage other states to believe that they also need to develop or improve their own nuclear arsenals, leading to dangerous proliferation and an accelerating arms race.

Instead, the United States should deemphasize the importance of nuclear weapons in its security policy as it works with the other nuclear armed states to eliminate these weapons altogether.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

How much does the U.S. spend on nuclear weapons? This section of our Beginner’s Guide to Nuclear Weapons provides context on current U.S. spending on nuclear weapons.

The Two Hundred Billion Dollar Boondoggle. This June 2025 backgrounder from the Federation of American Scientists examines the costly and unnecessary Sentinel program to replace all of the U.S. land-based missiles.

US Nuclear Modernization Programs. This August 2024 Arms Control Association backgrounder provides an overview of the proposed US nuclear modernization plans and costs.

Projected Costs of US Nuclear Forces (2025-2034). This April 2025 Congressional Budget Office (CBO) report provides an analysis of the estimated costs of U.S. nuclear forces over the next 10 years.